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ong a staple of Marine Corps 
thinking, the concept of fourth-
generation warfare (4GW) is 
gaining a broader audience. An in-
teresting Microsoft Power Point pre-
sentation discussing 4GW and the 
Iraqi insurgency recently surged to 
viewers beyond the beltway. This 
presentation complements the publi-
cation of Col Thomas X. Hammes' 
4GW book, The Sling and the Stone: 
On War in the 21st Century (Zenith 
Press, St. Paul, MN, 2004). 
Preparing for the Future 
4GW defies concise summariza-
tion. It is nonlinear, idea driven, and 
often involves nons tate actors who 
refuse to abide by the rules of con-
ventional conflict. Hammes de-
scribes this "anything goes" style of 
warfare as using: 
. . . all available networks-political, 
economic, social and military-to 
convince the enemy's political deci-
sion makers that their strategic goals 
are either unachievable or too costly 
for the perceived benefit. 
It is a favorite of insurgents, rebels, 
and other unconventional threats. It 
could even be the approach of the 
armies of developing countries. 
4GW discussions are a timely 
reminder of what are actually an-
cient verities of war. Indeed, there is 
much to recommend about the theo-
ry of 4GW, especially in addressing 
the current insurgency in Iraq. 4GW 
proponents are especially "on target" 
in highlighting the criticality of the 
psychological dimension of war, that 
is, the vital importance of truly 
understanding the adversary's mind-
set and what it takes to overcome it. 
Unfortunately, popular interpre-
tations of 4GW have significant intel-
lectual-and practical-gaps. For ex-
ample, in today's incarnation 4GW is 
unabashedly hostile to technology. 
This is a deviation from its original 
construct and out of line with the 
view of its more thoughtful adher-
ents today. Thus, some 4GW think-
ing has great potential to be misused 
and misunderstood as a rationale to 
redirect national defense resources 
away from technologies critical to 
maintaining military dominance in 
the 21st century. In many pitches 
about 4GW you will see lots of in-
triguing quotes critiquing what is 
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portrayed as the United States' over-
reliance upon technology. We need 
to consider these carefully, especially 
since Americans (airmen in particu-
lar, as the late military analyst and 
author Carl Builder was wont to 
note) can become overly enamored 
with technology for technology'S 
sake. That said, one of the quotes 
you won't see in this or any 4GW 
presentation, and one to consider 
along with the critiques of technolo-
gy, is that of historians Ronald Hay-
cock and Keith Neilson. They omi-
nously warn that military technology 
has the nasty habit of permitting "the 
division of mankind into ruler and 
ruled." Trivializing the role of tech-
nology in war can be catastrophic. 
Polish cavalrymen learned that when 
facing German Panzers and Stukas at 
the outset of World War II. 
Absent a disciplined approach, 
4GW analysis becomes an exercise in 
planning to "fight the last war," 
which is, from a strategic perspec-
tive, the current insurgency in Iraq. 
As important as it is to succeed in 
Iraq, we ought to be very careful 
about allowing 4G W proponents to 
dramatically reorient our entire 
defense establishment to address to-
day's threat at the expense of failing 
to prepare to meet tomorrow's most 
dangerous possible peril-a powerful 
peer competitor like China. 
In truth, nothing Iraqi insurgents 
(or, frankly, even al-Qaeda terrorists) 
can do could threaten the continued 
survival of the United States as a free 
country. It is true that extremely griev-
ous harm might be inflicted by 
them-and we must work to prevent 
that-but inflicting truly fatal harm is 
only a possibility for a peer competi-
tor with a major, high-tech military 
capability (along with a significant 
inventory of nuclear weapons, not 
just one or a handful). 
Examine Required Capabilities 
As we look to the future, there will 
likely be situations where all we want 
or need to do to an adversary is to 
destroy his physical capability to pro-
ject military power. 4GW advocates 
seem to think that we will always be 
in the "defeat and nation-build" 
mode. Actually, remaking/rebuild-
ing societies may very often not be 
on our agenda in future conflicts. 
Frankly, the notion of occupying an 
opponent's territory and remaking 
his political! cultural system may not 
be feasible or even particularly de-
sired under many circumstances. We 
will never wish, for example, to occu-
py any portion of any of the nations 
that may become military peer com-
petitors in the 21st century. Protect-
ing ourselves from their force pro-
jection potential may completely sat-
isfy our objectives. 
To the untutored and shortsight-
ed, exposure to 4G W aficionados 
could lead to an assumption that all 
security problems are solvable by 
some amalgam of the Marine Corps 
and special forces (a view I doubt is 
actually shared by those forces or, 
for that matter, the more thoughtful 
analysts of 4GW). Regardless, as im-
portant as those capabilities are, they 
(or some combination of them) 
could not alone stop an authentic 
peer competitor bent on our destruc-
tion as a viable political entity. 
The reality is that it takes decisive 
quantities of dominating weaponry 
along with well-trained warfighters 
from across all of the military Ser-

















could really jeopardize the existence 
of the United States as anything we 
would recognize today. As terrific as 
the Marine Corps is and as talented 
as the special forces community is, I 
suspect that military planners of 
potentially hostile nations, like So-
viet planners before them and Iraqi 
insurgents today, find them difficult 
but confrontable opponents. 
Though it is an anathema to 4GW 
zealots, what actually inflicts despair 
and hopelessness upon the minds of 
adversaries these days is overwhelm-
ing dominating weapons. It is being 
attacked by systems against which the 
most hardened and dedicated war-
fighters are helpless. Yes, I am talking 
about things like the F/ A-22 and the 
Joint Strike Fighter, that is, weapons 
that can dictate who lives and who dies 
on tomorrow's battlefields. Such capa-
bilities can hold at risk every object 
they value in their society. And though 
it is faddish in the think tank circles to 
conclude otherwise, it is actually silly 
to suggest that the "ideas" and "cul-
ture" of a society-especially one with 
rapidly rising quality-of-life expecta-
tions-are unrelated to the objects it 
possesses and desires. Even seemingly 
ideologically driven opponents very 
often have valued touchstones in 
material objects. 
It is the array of high-tech, unique-
ly American weaponry that causes 
our potential peer competitors to 
know that achieving their objectives 
by force is simply not obtainable 
within their lifetimes. In truth, it is 
the inability to control the air, not 
any number of ground forces, how-
ever skilled, that wakes them up at 
night in a cold sweat. And it is not 
just airpower; it is the insurmount-
able gap in the quantity and quality 
of U.S. ballistic missile and attack 
submarines. And before we start 
tossing out so-called "legacy" systems 
as "unchic," consider the reports 
about the dread that Iraqi insurgents 
have about the fearsome MIAI tank. 
Think about what these platforms 
and other high-tech weapons can do 
to the minds of potential enemies. 
4GW devotees too often completely 
miss the profound psychological 
impact on even the most combat-
hardened fighters of technology 
against which they are completely 
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helpless. Warfighters like to say that 
the enemy "always gets a vote" as to 
whether a combat operation suc-
ceeds. What American technology 
can do in many instances is to literal-
ly disenfranchise the adversary. The 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
were just as tough and determined as 
the mujahideen who successfully 
fought the Russians. What proved to 
be decisive was the ability to hold at 
risk Soviet military aviation with the 
help of U.S. Stinger missiles. That 
circumstance did not exist in Op-
eration ENDURING FREEDOM. 
The emergence of extremely accu-
rate joint direct attack munitions and 
other precision technology changed 
things radically. They enabled the 
application of precise combat power 
from beyond the range of any defensive 
weapon. This development did not 
just physically destroy enemy forces; 
it crushed their will to fight. There is 
nothing like a feeling of total vulner-
ability to undermine fighting spirit. 
Force majeure-Napoleon's "big 
battalions" so to speak-sounds anti-
quated, but thousands of years of 
military history prove otherwise. In 
21st century conflicts, "mass" ought 
to be defined by deliverable combat 
power, not numbers per se. And it is 
ludicrous to suggest that high tech-
nology does not create deliverable 
combat power in distinctively effec-
tive ways. 
In 21st century warfare, control of 
the air and sea mediums will, more 
than anything else, eliminate the 
force projection capabilities/ possi-
bilities/hopes of potential adver-
saries. The ability to exercise that 
control is essential-and irreplace-
able-to safeguarding the U.S. home-
land in the coming years. 
>BGen Dunlap serves as the Staff Judge 
Advocate, Air Combat Command, Langley 
Air Force Base, VA. His views and opinions 
are his alone and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the U.S. Government or any of its 
components. 
Marine Cmps Gazette u July 2005 
